Benefits

Because land ownership is concentrated among the wealthy, a land value tax falls disproportionately on high-wealth households — making it both efficient and progressive.

High-rate capture of natural-resource rent is workable and durable: Norway taxes petroleum at a 78% marginal rate on a cash-flow basis, has banked over $2 trillion in the world's largest sovereign wealth fund, and spends only ~3% a year — the textbook escape from the resource curse. But the escape i

Pricing the scarce right to emit — charging for use of the atmospheric commons — measurably reduces emissions wherever it has been tried, at little cost to growth: British Columbia's revenue-neutral carbon tax cut per-capita fuel use ~19% while GDP outpaced the rest of Canada; cross-country and EU-E

Charging for scarce peak road space produces large, measured falls in traffic and congestion wherever it has been tried — Singapore (1975), London (2003), Stockholm (2006) — and Stockholm's cost-benefit analysis, built on measured data, shows the social benefits recover the system's cost in about fo

Causal evidence from Mexico shows raising property-tax rates increases welfare — though coercive enforcement, unlike rate increases, can reduce it.

LVT reliably lowers land prices (tax capitalization) and encourages construction — but its effect on rents actually paid is mixed, and affordability gains require permissive zoning; capturing land value alone need not make housing cheap.

By imposing an annual cost on holding land, LVT reduces the incentive to hold sites idle for speculative gain — shrinking the booms and busts of the land cycle.

Split-rate taxation increases housing density in the locations where it is applied — the mechanism anti-sprawl arguments predict — but whether this reduces sprawl at the metropolitan level depends on where the tax is adopted.

Because land supply is fixed, the economic incidence of a land value tax falls on the landowner — capitalized into lower land prices, not shifted to tenants through higher rents. The theory, the capitalization evidence, and the rental-market measurements, with the honest caveats.

Shifting tax from capital to land raises welfare: land taxes carry no deadweight loss while capital taxes discourage investment.

Descriptive and causal evidence from Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend, plus a peer-reviewed global simulation, indicate that distributing rent as equal per-capita dividends reduces poverty and compresses the income distribution — though one econometric study finds inequality worsened.

Corporate tax bases that exempt the normal return and tax only above-normal returns — the ACE and cash-flow designs — demonstrably remove the tax subsidy to leverage and, in the expensing variant, stimulate investment. The honest limits: multinationals arbitraged unilateral versions, every full Euro

Alaska's decades-long Permanent Fund Dividend shows that capturing natural-resource rent and distributing it as a citizen's dividend is administratively and politically durable.

Across US case studies, shifting property tax off buildings and onto land is followed by more construction — the effect Georgist theory predicts.

Shifting taxes off work and investment onto land and rents removes deadweight loss and is associated with higher long-run GDP per capita — the least-harmful-tax evidence is strong, while direct evidence of productivity gains is more model-based and contested.