Narratives

Gaffney's claim that a modified Georgism 'helped run the USA' for seventeen years (1902-19) through both major parties — a historiographical argument, attributed, about the single-tax movement's reach into Progressive Era politics.

Where land dispossession and the Black–white wealth gap actually meet — farmland loss, redlined-out home equity, heirs' property — and where they do not: rent capture is not reparations and does not, on its own, close the gap. With Fairhope's own segregation carried as an in-movement failure.

Geoism and Indigenous land justice share a diagnosis — that dispossession enclosed a common inheritance and that land value is community-created — but diverge sharply on the remedy: rent capture versus restitution, jurisdiction, and Land Back. Where Indigenous scholars reject market-framework rem...

The design blueprint for the wiki's twelve persuasive narratives: taxonomy, slugs, core claims, promoters, evidence maps, honest gaps, related objections, and deployment notes. This is the index T2 drafters work from; it is not itself a reader-facing narrative page.

The moral story that rent from land and natural resources is common property — paid out equally, it gives everyone a visible stake in the commons. Alaska's forty-year dividend is the anchor fact; the honest caveats are that it is oil rent, not location rent, and that windfalls can corrode as well...

The environmental extension of the Georgist principle: pollution and extraction are unpaid takings of common natural wealth, and charging rent for them — capped carbon, resource royalties, land taxes that favour compact use — returns the commons to its owners. The thinnest-evidenced narrative of ...

The claim that recurrent, credit-financed land speculation — not some sector-neutral business cycle — drives booms and the crashes that follow, sometimes traced to a recurring ~18-year rhythm, with land value tax offered as the structural remedy.

The efficiency and equity case for shifting taxation off wages and investment and onto land: land cannot flee, shrink, or hide from a tax, so taxing it wastes nothing — and, because land ownership is concentrated among the wealthy, it can be progressive too.

The forward-looking fiscal case that location value is produced by public investment and the surrounding community — so recovering it for public use returns value to those who created it. The evidence, the limits of the Henry George Theorem, and how to deploy the story.

The insider narrative — Gaffney's argument that early neoclassical economists, patronized by landed interests, collapsed land into capital to bury Henry George — presented against the mainstream historiography that the two-factor turn was analytic. Both accounts, attributed; deployment guidance s...

The justice narrative: existing land titles descend from enclosure, conquest, and dispossession, not production — so capturing land rent going forward is restitution without confiscation, advocates argue. The history, the revisionist counter-evidence, the strongest objection, and careful deployme...

The practical case that housing is expensive because land is expensive — and that taxing land values, paired with permissive zoning, channels land into homes. The supply evidence, the honest limits (capture alone doesn't cheapen housing), and deployment guidance for urbanist audiences.

The claim that a rising share of income rewards asset ownership and economic rent — above all land under housing, and by extension finance and digital platforms — rather than production. Traces Hudson's FIRE-sector critique and Mazzucato's value-extraction framework to the Rognlie/Bonnet evidence...

The historical flagship story — one levy on land values could replace taxation of work and enterprise — traced from George's proposal through the movement it built, with the revenue arithmetic honestly contested, the counter-arguments, and guidance on deploying it today.

The administrative-simplicity case for LVT: land cannot be hidden, moved offshore, or re-domiciled, making it the hardest tax base to avoid — with the honest caveat that evasion mutates into under-assessment and political manipulation of valuations rather than disappearing.

The moral case that rising land values are created by the community, not the owner — traced from Mill's coinage through George and the 1909 People's Budget to modern capitalization evidence, with the counter-arguments, the historical record, and guidance on deploying it.

The recurring claim that structural change has ended the old boom-bust pattern -- from Homer Hoyt's 1933 prediction his land cycle was 'only of interest to historians' to the broader 'this time is different' fallacy Reinhart and Rogoff document across eight centuries of financial crises.