Land Value Capture

Definition

Land value capture (LVC) is the umbrella term for policies that recover publicly created land value for the public. When a government builds a transit line, rezones an area, or provides services, nearby land rises in value — the unearned increment. LVC mechanisms return some or all of that increase to the public that created it.

Instruments

• Land value tax / split-rate tax — recurrent taxation of land value (LVT, split-rate).
• Betterment levies / special assessments — one-time charges on properties benefiting from a public project.
• Tax increment financing (TIF) — funding infrastructure from the resulting rise in tax base.
• Public land leasing — the state retains ownership and leases land, capturing appreciation directly (as in Singapore and Hong Kong).
• Land Value Increment Tax — taxing the gain at transfer (as in Taiwan).
• Community benefit charges — Ontario's CBC (collected since 2022, capped at 4% of land value at building-permit issuance) is a live Canadian example; Dachis (2023) recommends raising its cap while cutting per-unit development charges, arguing land-value capture is the right tool for financing amenities where user fees don't fit.
• Density bonusing and amenity cost charges — Vancouver has traded extra development rights for public benefits since at least the 2005 cultural-amenity bonus that built the VSO School of Music, and under British Columbia's Bill 46 (2023) is moving from negotiated contributions to a published city-wide charge from September 2026; see Vancouver for the record and for the argument that the city has used capture to prevent uplift rather than to create it.[14]
• Negotiated PILOTs and community-benefit funds — for large, discrete land uses without a formula-based instrument, capture is sometimes bargained case-by-case instead. Data centers, now among the highest-value land uses in many US jurisdictions, show how much this depends on negotiating leverage: Loudoun County, Virginia's data-center tax base generates roughly $1.3 billion a year (about 45% of the county's total tax revenue), letting the county cut its residential property-tax rate over a decade, while Columbus, Ohio granted a 100%, 15-year property-tax abatement worth roughly $54 million to a Google data center that created only about 20 jobs — the same land use, capturing public value or forfeiting it entirely, depending on the deal a local government secures.[4]

For a current practitioner-level survey of these instruments — Canadian and international case studies, mechanism comparisons, and an honest account of administrative complexity and typical yields — see the CIB-commissioned Land Value Capture Study (Siemiatycki, Fagan & Arku, 2023).

Walters (2012) sets out four practical conditions a property tax must meet to function as an LVC instrument — rising private land values, timely reassessment, a maintained effective rate, and adequate resulting revenue — and argues that the recurring annual property tax, not one-time betterment charges, is the more reliable long-run LVC instrument once those conditions hold. In a fixed-effects panel of 156 US metropolitan areas, he finds a 1% rise in a metro's income-based cash-flow measure was followed by roughly a 0.27% rise in property tax revenue three to five years later.[10]

Significance

LVC is the pragmatic, widely-adopted face of Georgist ideas: even governments that would never embrace a "single tax" routinely use betterment levies and lease revenue. It is a major research focus of the Lincoln Institute.

Recent Case Studies and Critiques (2025–26)

• Grand Paris Express (France). Maulat & Aveline-Dubach (2025), in Land Use Policy, examine the land-value-capture (LVC) mechanisms adopted for the Grand Paris Express — one of Europe's largest ongoing urban transit projects, led by the state-owned Société des Grands Projets (SGP) — combining LVC literature with the sociology of policy instruments, drawing on documentary analysis and interviews with SGP and transport/planning-institution representatives. They find a shift in LVC from a tax-based to a development-based instrument, resulting in around eighty real-estate projects launched on land acquired for the metro. While the resulting projects — shaped by local trade-offs and marked by heterogeneity — support transit-oriented development and housing production near stations, the paper's own conclusion is sharper than mere variation: "the design of the development-based instrument undermines the provision of affordable housing," and the authors call for further research on the interconnections between infrastructure financing, LVC policy instrumentation, and urban planning. The account here rests on the paper's full bilingual abstract, available through an open-access mirror of the HAL repository record; the published full text is not publicly accessible, and no claim below the abstract level is made.
• England ("Who should own the value of land?", 2026). A UK Collaborative Centre for Housing Evidence (CaCHE) report by Edward Shepherd (Cardiff University) and Tim White (King's College London), drawing on over 50 interviews, argues that land value capture, as currently practised in England, "manages and holds together the structural flaws of the existing land, housing and development settlement without resolving them" — that the persistence of unequal land-value gains is not a technical policy-design failure but a structural one, and that "what is truly needed are more ambitious social-redistributive measures involving landed property and its value combined with a wider range of less speculative development models." This wording is quoted directly from the CaCHE project page's own summary of the report; the report's full PDF (Cardiff University's ORCA repository copy) is not publicly accessible, so no page-level or section-level claim from the full report is made — only the project page's own two direct quotations above.
• An unused statutory levy: Muntinlupa, Philippines (2026). The Local Government Code of 1991 gives Philippine cities a special levy on land benefited by locally funded works, capped at 60% of project cost and payable over five to ten years, and a peer-reviewed 2024 study found Metro Manila's cities had never used it for want of institutional and technical capacity.[19][20] A journalist-author's case study of Muntinlupa's CARES access road, built by the city for about ₱39 million and opened in 2013, estimates an uplift of roughly ₱476 million across the subdivision it connected to the Filinvest City business district, with the road's cost 8% of the gain and the city collecting nothing while private sticker fees are charged for access; the estimate is the author's own and the paper unpublished. The levy's cost cap means it could recover at most about ₱23 million of that uplift, the limit of a cost-recovery instrument; see Betterment Levy.[21]
• Tax increment as loan security: Transbay, San Francisco. ICLEI USA, the American arm of the local-government network, published a July 2026 white paper recommending tax increment financing as a land-value-capture tool for transit and climate projects, with the Transbay Transit Center as its lead case. The official record is more precise than the guide. The Transbay Joint Powers Authority's $171 million federal TIFIA loan is secured by a senior lien on project revenues of which 98% are dedicated tax increment from the former state-owned parcels around the terminal, sold and developed, and land sales themselves contributed $515.6 million toward a Phase 1 cost of about $2.26 billion; the financing sits inside the 2005 Transbay redevelopment area, the 2012 Transit Center District Plan and a 2014 community facilities district.[15][16] The guide's own figures, a $4.2 billion cost and 40 acres redeveloped, do not match that profile. David Merriman, whose Lincoln Institute report on TIF is the standard reference and who reviewed the ICLEI paper, draws the line the guide blurs: because TIF diverts revenue from appreciation that may partly reflect public investment, "some observers may erroneously believe that TIF is a land value capture tool separate from the property tax"; it captures the existing tax on land and buildings together, not new value.[17][18]
• Tax increment financing in practice: San Antonio's TIRZ system (2026). For a ground-level picture of how TIF actually operates — and where it drifts from the value-capture ideal — the San Antonio Report's explainer on Texas's Tax Increment Reinvestment Zones (TIRZ) is instructive. San Antonio has nine zones (five downtown) in which growth in property-tax value above a frozen base is redirected from citywide coffers to improvements within the zone; in fiscal 2025 roughly $45 million — about 5% of the city's $819 million in levied property tax — was captured in TIRZes, and 14% of a $160 million minor-league ballpark is slated to be funded through the Houston Street TIRZ. The piece airs a structural critique from property-law scholar Heather Way (UT Austin): because a wealthier area generates more increment, TIRZ revenue "is being captured within the TIRZ and is not going to fund other parts of the city," and zones originally justified as short-term (typical 20-year sunset) have been extended decades past their end dates, becoming standing authorities spending what "otherwise should be going to the general fund." Transparency is thin: the Houston Street TIRZ board — the very zone underwriting the ballpark — had not met in the current year at the time of writing and did not meet the year before either, having gathered twice the year prior to that; and while the Texas Open Meetings Act requires agendas to be posted, it does not require minutes or recordings, which the city makes available only on written request after board approval. The Georgist reading: TIF captures publicly created increments, but where the captured value goes is a distributional design choice — a zone-bound TIF can entrench geographic inequality in a way a citywide land value tax cannot.[7]
• A second, mechanically distinct TIF side-effect: Wisconsin's levy-limit interaction (2026). San Antonio's TIRZ problem is about where captured value goes; Wisconsin surfaces a different failure mode entirely — TIF can mechanically raise tax bills for residents entirely outside the TIF district. Wisconsin caps how much a municipality's total property-tax levy can grow each year, tying the allowed increase to the percentage of "net new construction" added to the tax base. New construction inside a TIF district counts toward that allowed levy increase, but the district's added assessed value is excluded from the tax base used to spread the resulting levy across taxpayers — so, per the Wisconsin Legislative Council's own explanation, "the mill rate will increase from the prior year, because the mill rate's numerator increases while the denominator stays the same." The effect is not intrinsic to TIF itself — a city could avoid it simply by not levying the full increase it's permitted — but Badger Institute reporting notes some local officials deny the mechanism occurs until shown the Legislative Council's own documentation, and cites a 647-acre former-farmland TIF district near Port Washington, created to fund water and sewer infrastructure for a data-center project, as a live current example. Read together, San Antonio and Wisconsin show TIF's distributional risk cuts two ways: value can be captured and hoarded within a wealthy zone (Texas), or a zone's construction can be counted for levy purposes while its added value is excluded from the base that spreads the resulting bill (Wisconsin) — two structurally different routes to the same outcome, non-TIF taxpayers paying more than the "growth pays for itself" framing implies.[8]
• Heritage-led LVC in Asia: a systematic review (2026). A systematic literature review by Kartika Listriana and Walter Timo de Vries (both Technical University of Munich), published in the International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning, reconstructs a corpus of 20 studies (2018–2025, concentrated in 2020 and 2023) covering China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam, plus one comparative China/US study. Drawing on that corpus, the review builds a typology of how heritage designation, conservation controls, tourism activity, public investment, and adaptive-reuse or planning regulation move land and property values — through amenity and prestige effects, scarcity from conservation restrictions, accessibility gains, and redevelopment-pressure or displacement effects that can run in either direction — and pairs these channels with the LVC instruments the literature applies to them: betterment levies and development charges where a public improvement produces measurable uplift, transferable development rights and land readjustment where conservation restrictions constrain on-site redevelopment, and joint development or public-private partnership where public land or public assets are involved. Named intersection cases include heritage-protection value capture at West Lake, heritage-led redevelopment and "uneven community outcomes" in Xi'an, LVC-linked heritage financing at Kota Lama Tangerang (Indonesia), and a Dihua Street (Taiwan) transfer-of-development-rights case tied to moderating displacement. The review is explicit that it offers a qualitative governance-conditions typology rather than a quantified synthesis: it reports no pooled or quantified effect sizes for any instrument, states that its 20-study corpus "is too small to support robust network inference," and concludes that current studies do not establish that captured LVC revenues have systematically produced conservation, resilience, or equity outcomes across Asian cities.
• Chicago's TIF program at scale (2026). A UIC Great Cities Institute audit of four decades of Chicago TIF — a parcel panel of roughly 750,000 properties a year matched against 346 tracked TIF projects — is the largest and most methodologically developed TIF case study the wiki currently carries. Its headline pairing sharpens the San Antonio and Wisconsin cases above into a single number: TIF raised Chicago property-tax rates for all city property owners by an average of 13.7 percent over 2014–2023 (18.6 percent by 2023), while the report's preferred estimate is that only 1.8 percent of the property-value growth TIF captures is attributable to TIF investment itself — the rest is organic appreciation the general tax base would have received regardless. That finding is robust to how much credit TIF is given for the value it captures (the rate-shift figure stays within a 17–19 percent band across four scenarios spanning "TIF causes nothing" to a deliberately pro-TIF stress test); the exact attribution share is not, ranging from 0 to about 6 percent across the same four scenarios. About 51 percent of tracked TIF spending since 1986 went to downtown Chicago and its immediate neighbors.
• São Paulo's building-rights charges (OODC, CEPAC, FUNDURB) (2017–2020 evidence). São Paulo charges developers a formula-based fee for floor area above a basic floor-area ratio and pays it into an urban development fund; Friendly (2017) reports almost R$1.9 billion collected over 2004–2015, peaking at R$339.9 million in 2011.[12] Inside the Água Espraiada Urban Operation, auctioned building-rights certificates (CEPACs) raised R$2.9 billion over 2004–2012, but Mahendra et al. (2020) report that 59.6 percent of the operation's spending went to roads and that at least 8,000 families were displaced.[13] See São Paulo for the instruments, the fund's governance and what the sources do and do not show.

Book Findings

Howard: Garden City as LVT Application

Ebenezer Howard's Garden Cities of To-morrow (1902) is one of the most detailed practical applications of land value capture ever proposed. Howard's "rate-rent" mechanism — in which all ground rents based on the annual value of land are paid to the municipality — is a form of LVC implemented through communal land ownership rather than taxation. Howard estimated that on a 6,000-acre estate with 30,000 residents, the rate-rent could yield approximately £50,000 per annum at the outset, rising as the town prospered (Howard 1902, Ch. I–III, pp. 20–43 — the estate purchase is set out in Ch. I, the rate-rent/unearned-increment mechanism in Ch. II, and the £50,000 revenue table specifically in Ch. III).

Howard's mechanism captures the same value that LVC instruments target — the unearned increment created by community presence and public investment — but does so through a trust ownership model rather than a tax on private title:

"One essential feature of the plan is that all ground rents, which are to be based upon the annual value of the land, shall be paid to the trustees, who, after providing for interest and sinking fund, will hand the balance to the Central Council of the new municipality, to be employed by such Council in the creation and maintenance of all necessary public works." (Howard 1902, Ch. I)

This is functionally equivalent to a full land value tax: the community captures 100% of the land rent and applies it to public purposes. The difference is institutional — a trust rather than a tax authority — but the economic substance is the same. Howard's model thus demonstrates that LVC need not be limited to partial betterment levies or special assessments; it can, in principle, capture the full land rent stream.

See: Garden Cities of To-morrow (Howard)

See Also

• California Irrigation Districts and the Wright Act (1887) — the early American land-value-financed infrastructure experiment
• Sampat: The Rentier Economy of Growth Infrastructures in India — a cautionary case where value capture by capital outpaces actual infrastructure delivery
• Troy, Randolph & Pinnegar: Value Switching — Extracting Profit from the City — Sydney evidence of hundred-million-dollar value uplifts triggered by rezoning decisions alone
• UIC Great Cities Institute: Chicago's Tax Increment Financing — Who Paid, Who Gained? — a 40-year, parcel-panel audit finding Chicago TIF raised citywide tax rates by an average of 13.7 percent while only 1.8 percent of the value it captured was TIF-attributable
• Liu & Zhu: Contested Rent-Based Urban Governance in China — even public capture of land rent raises live governance questions about which government tier captures it
• Shepherd: The Ideological Morphology of Land Value Capture — a political-theory account of why UK LVC policy has cycled between active and passive state roles for 80 years
• Alvarez & Biderman: Market Power in Housing Markets — uses a São Paulo LVC instrument's own rate-schedule kinks to measure builder market power
• Turkienicz: Synchronous TDR Credits — the wiki's first dedicated coverage of Transferable Development Rights as an LVC instrument
• K'Akumu: The Principles of Land Value Capture in the Perspective of Georgist Political Economy — a unifying taxonomy distinguishing Georgist site-value taxation from non-Georgist betterment strategies
• Netherlands — municipal 'active land policy' (land acquisition, servicing, and resale/lease) as a non-tax model of land value capture, alongside near-universal developer obligations
• London — case study: TfL/GLA found the Jubilee Line Extension, DLR, and North London Line produced 52%, 23%, and 6% land value uplifts respectively, mostly uncaptured by the public
• New Towns Act 1946 — the UK program that built 32 new towns on land bought at agricultural prices, capturing the planning-driven uplift to fund development
• Compulsory Purchase and Eminent Domain — the state acquisition power that, when compensation is set at existing-use value, functions as a complementary land-value-capture instrument
• UN Habitat 1976 Land Value Recapture Resolution — the 1976 UN conference resolution that first put land-value-capture principles into international consensus language
• Air Rights — the private-market analogue: sellable development rights (e.g. Tiffany & Co.'s $5M sale for Trump Tower) show location value is separable and priceable, though the proceeds stay private rather than being publicly captured
• India's Value Capture Financing Framework (MoHUA, 2017) — a six-instrument national framework covering the world's most populous country, adopted patchily nine years on
• Could a Land Value Tax Fund the Interborough Express? (NYC, 2026) — a live US transit-financing debate invoking New York's 2016 value-capture law
• Land Pooling / Readjustment — a non-tax route to value capture, widely used in India and analogues in Germany/Japan/China, exchanging serviced plots for a share of landowners' pooled land rather than a cash betterment charge alone
• Telosa — a high-profile contemporary attempt to build a new city on Georgist land-value-capture principles ('Equitism')
• Garden City Movement — Howard's Garden Cities — a built land-value-capture precedent
• Betterment Levy
• O'Brien & Dembski: Land Value Capture for Place Quality — comparative Scotland/Netherlands/Germany evidence on what makes LVC actually deliver design quality
• McAllister: Developer or Land Owner Contributions? — a taxonomy of England's developer-contribution instruments and their incidence
• Medda & Modelewska: Land Value Capture and the Warsaw Metro — hedonic evidence that Warsaw metro access (built and merely planned) raised nearby house prices 6.7–7.1%, plus a comparative table of Helsinki, Copenhagen, Toronto, and Milan metro-financing schemes
• Fiorentino & Moogan: LVT and Urban Agglomeration Dynamics — a Cambridge Land Economy model of how LVT interacts with agglomeration efficiency and equity
• Giesen: FDR's Self-Financing Highways Proposal — a 1930s US federal case where excess-condemnation land value capture was proposed for highway finance, then abandoned on feasibility grounds
• Unearned Increment · Taiwan · Singapore
• Outcome: Public investment capitalizes into nearby land values — the empirical basis LVC mechanisms recover
• Narrative: The Community Creates Land Value — the persuasive story built on this policy family
• Garden Cities of To-morrow (Howard) — Howard's rate-rent as LVC application

Sources

1. Lincoln Institute studies of land value capture (Taiwan, Hong Kong case studies) — used for the instrument taxonomy and the operating examples (A/B-claims). Taiwan PDF
2. Dye & England (2010) — used for the relationship between value capture and land value taxation (A-claims). wiki summary
3. Ebenezer Howard, Garden Cities of To-morrow (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1902), Ch. I–II — used for the rate-rent mechanism as LVC (A/C-claims). Book page
4. Greg Miller, "Don't Reject Data Centers. Negotiate Harder.", Progress and Poverty (Substack), 6 May 2026. progressandpoverty.substack.com — used for the Loudoun County (VA) and Columbus (OH) data-center tax-revenue and abatement figures (B-claim, advocacy-institute source).
5. Juliette Maulat & Natacha Aveline-Dubach, "Shifting land value capture instruments for the Grand Paris Express metro," Land Use Policy 161 (2026): 107854. DOI — used for the Grand Paris Express case (B-claim, full bilingual abstract read via CORE.ac.uk's mirror of the HAL repository record, read 2026-08-10; the ScienceDirect and HAL full-text pages themselves are not publicly accessible).
6. Edward Shepherd & Tim White, "Who should own the value of land? Housing, power and the deep politics of land value capture," UK Collaborative Centre for Housing Evidence (CaCHE), Cardiff University, 2026. CaCHE project page · ORCA repository copy — used for the report's core argument, now with two direct quotations from the project page's own summary, read 2026-08-10 (D-claim; the full report PDF is not publicly accessible, so quotation is limited to what the project page itself reproduces).
7. Shari Biediger, "TIRZ explained: It's how SA will fund the new ballpark, Spurs arena," San Antonio Report, August 2026. sanantonioreport.org — article read in full, 2026-08-14; used for the nine-zone count, the FY2025 $45M/~5%-of-$819M capture figures (attributed in the article to city CFO Troy Elliott), the ballpark financing shares, the Heather Way quotations and sunset-extension critique, and the board-meeting/minutes transparency details (B-claims; local journalism, quoted figures are the article's own).
8. Patrick McIlheran, "How a development tool can increase property taxes," Badger Institute, 20 August 2026. badgerinstitute.org — read in full, 2026-08-23; used for the Wisconsin net-new-construction levy-limit mechanism, the Wisconsin Legislative Council's own mill-rate explanation (quoted verbatim), the up-to-27-year TIF diversion period, the local-official-denial point, and the Port Washington-area 647-acre data-center TIF example (B-claim; local policy journalism from a free-market-oriented think tank).
9. Kartika Listriana & Walter Timo de Vries, "Cultural Heritage, Land Value Dynamics, and Land Value Capture Governance in Asia: A Systematic Literature Review," International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning 21(8) (2026): 3423–3437, IIETA. DOI — full text read, 2026-09-24; used for the 20-study corpus profile, the heritage-value/LVC-instrument typology, and the named intersection case studies (West Lake, Xi'an, Kota Lama Tangerang, Dihua Street) (C-claim; a qualitative synthesis review, not quantified evidence). Venue and methodology caveats: IJSDP/IIETA is a broad-scope, lower-tier venue rather than a specialist planning or public-finance journal; the review's own methodology discloses single-reviewer screening with no independent dual-reviewer check, and a revision-stage "corrective audit" in which the original 2025 record-level search export was not preserved, so the final 20-study corpus was reconstructed de novo from a 64-reference working pool rather than verified against the original search. The second author (Technical University of Munich) has a peer-reviewed land-administration research record; the first author's academic standing is unconfirmed. Cited here as "a 2026 systematic review found," not as settled research findings.
10. Lawrence C. Walters, "Are Property-Related Taxes Effective Value Capture Instruments?," ch. 8 in Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong, eds., Value Capture and Land Policies (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2012), 187–206. lincolninst.edu — used for the four practical conditions for property-tax LVC and the 156-MSA cash-flow-to-property-tax-revenue finding (A-claim; peer-reviewed-adjacent edited academic volume). Wiki summary.
11. Juan D. González, Matthew D. Wilson, Teresa Córdova & Jason "Jay" Campos, Chicago's Tax Increment Financing: Who Paid, Who Gained?, UIC Great Cities Institute, August 2026. greatcities.uic.edu — used for the Chicago TIF tax-rate-shift, but-for attribution, and downtown-spending-concentration figures (B-claim, Tier 1 institutional report). Full detail on this wiki's dedicated summary.
12. Abigail Friendly, "Land Value Capture and Social Benefits: Toronto and São Paulo Compared," IMFG Papers on Municipal Finance and Governance No. 33, University of Toronto, 2017. hdl.handle.net/1807/81190 — used for the São Paulo OODC revenue series, 2004–2015, and its 2011 peak (printed p. 17) (B-claim; academic working paper). Full detail on the São Paulo page.
13. Anjali Mahendra et al., "Urban Land Value Capture in São Paulo, Addis Ababa, and Hyderabad," WRI Working Paper commissioned by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, December 2020. wri.org — used for the Água Espraiada CEPAC revenue, the 59.6 percent road share of spending and the displacement figure (pp. 2–3, 15–16) (B-claim; research-institute working paper).
14. British Columbia, Bill 46 – 2023, Housing Statutes (Development Financing) Amendment Act, 2023. bclaws.gov.bc.ca — used for the amenity-cost-charge framework (A-claim; statute); the Vancouver detail is carried on Vancouver.
15. Federal Highway Administration, Center for Innovative Finance Support, "Project Profile: Transbay Transit Center." fhwa.dot.gov — used for the Phase 1 cost ($2,259.4 million), the $515.6 million in land sales, the $171 million TIFIA loan and its security in tax increment from the state-owned parcels (98% of pledged revenues) (A-claim; official body; a pre-completion profile).
16. Office of the Controller, City and County of San Francisco, memorandum on the Transbay Joint Powers Authority community facilities district, 20 April 2020. onesanfrancisco.org — used for the 2005 redevelopment area, the 2012 Transit Center District Plan and CFD No. 2014-1 (A-claim; official body).
17. ICLEI USA (Brian McCartan), Tax Increment Financing and Land Value Capture, white paper, July 2026. icleiusa.thinkific.com — used for the practitioner body's recommendation and its Transbay figures (D-claim; Tier 2: a membership association's guidance, carried as its position; its $4.2 billion and 40-acre figures are unmatched to any official source).
18. David Merriman (2018), Improving Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for Economic Development, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Policy Focus Report, p. 12 ("TIF Is Not Additional Land Value Capture"). lincolninst.edu — used for the argument that TIF is a diversion of the existing property tax rather than a separate capture instrument (C-claim; Tier 1 scholar, stated as his argument).
19. Republic of the Philippines, Republic Act No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991, ss. 155, 240–243. lawphil.net — used for the special-levy power, its 60% cost cap, the five-to-ten-year instalment rule, apportionment by assessed value and the toll-fee power (A-claim; statute).
20. Sandra S. Samantela & Karl Sam M. Maquiling (2024), "Examining Institutional Challenges of Land Value Capture: The Case of Implementing Land-based Taxes in the Philippines," DOI 10.22004/ag.econ.340794. AgEcon Search — used for the finding that institutional, financial and technical capacity gaps have kept the special levy unused in Metro Manila (B-claim; peer-reviewed; abstract consulted, full text not retrievable).
21. Juan V. Sarmiento Jr., "Surge in land prices offers opportunity for land value capture in Muntinlupa," Coverstory.ph, 12 October 2026, summarising his paper to the 51st Sustainable Shared Growth seminar, 5 October 2026. coverstory.ph — used for the CARES case and the author's own estimates (D-claim; a journalist-author's own study, Tier 2: origin of the case, not support; the paper itself is not published).