Inferring Land Values in Oslo
Norges Bank staff apply the Davis-Heathcote residual method to a representative Oslo apartment and find real land-related values about three and a half times their 2003 level, with land's share of new-housing cost rising from about a third to just over half.
Summary
"Inferring Land Values in Oslo" is Norges Bank Staff Memo No. 7/2026, published 11 November 2026, by Anna Emilie Iden, Plamen Nenov (both Norges Bank) and Sonja Plaku (Norges Bank Investment Management).[1] It builds a quarterly land-price series for Oslo apartments, 2003 Q4 to 2025 Q4, with the Davis–Heathcote residual method. The authors report that real land-related values rose to about three and a half times their 2003 level, while the land share of new-housing cost rose from about a third to just over half.[1] A staff memo states the views of its authors, not official Norges Bank policy; findings below are Norges Bank staff estimates.
Method
The authors treat a dwelling as a bundle of a structure and "developable land," and take land as the residual: the used-home price minus the depreciated replacement cost of the structure (Section 3).[1] Unlike Davis and Heathcote's aggregate approach, the residual is applied to a representative Oslo apartment, not to individual properties or national stock totals.
- Price. Eiendomsverdi's average 2025 price per square metre is extended backwards with its quality-adjusted (SPAR) real index for used homes.
- Structure. Norsk Prisbok's 2025 construction cost is rolled back with Statistics Norway's construction cost index, plus an imputed financing cost.
- Depreciation. A hedonic regression on Land Register transactions gives an age discount, assuming land is 30 per cent of a dwelling's initial value and evaluating at the median Oslo apartment age of 29 years.[1]
Findings
- Level. At end-2025 real land prices in Oslo were about three and a half times their end-2003 level (Section 4.1).[1]
- Timing. Land prices rose much faster than house prices during 2003–2017 and have been broadly flat since. The authors suggest the debt-to-income rules introduced in early 2017 and higher construction costs as possible contributors.[1]
- Volatility. The standard deviation of the Hodrick–Prescott-filtered cyclical component is 9.1 per cent for real land prices, 4.5 per cent for real used-home prices and 1.6 per cent for replacement cost.[1]
- Replacement cost. It rose about 50 per cent, particularly after the Covid-19 pandemic: "not as pronounced as for land prices," but a real contribution to higher housing costs.[1]
- Land share. The implied land share of new-housing cost rose from about a third (32 per cent) in 2003 to just over half (53 per cent) at the end of the sample. It fell to about 32 per cent around the financial crisis and peaked near 59 per cent in 2017 Q1 (Section 4.2).[1]
- Worked example. With land just over half of value, a 30 per cent fall in land prices cuts property value by roughly 16 per cent; at the 2003 one-third share, by about 10 per cent.[1]
The abstract says land-related values "account for much of the cyclical variation in house prices." The memo does not decompose long-run house-price growth into land and structure.[1]
Relation to the Georgist Case
The memo is about measurement and financial stability, not taxation; it does not discuss land value taxation. Its relevance is evidentiary. A central-bank team finds that the part of Oslo housing value attributable to land is large, rising, and the most volatile component, in line with the US pattern in Davis and Heathcote. The authors' affordability point also fits the Georgist reading of economic rent: if pressure on new-housing cost "comes mainly from land rather than construction," measures that cut building costs may have little effect, "since part of the reduced building cost would go into higher land values" (Section 5).[1] They also note that landowners may delay development when the option value of waiting is high, which touches on land speculation; they offer this as a possibility, not a finding.[1]
Nuances and Limits
- "Developable land" is not pure land value. The residual includes the developer margin and the regulatory, financial and physical costs of bringing raw land to a buildable state. The authors say part of the residual "may reflect these costs rather than the scarcity value of land alone."[1]
- Planning delays. Statistics Norway data cited in the memo show average time from initial planning meeting to final approval of privately initiated detailed zoning plans in Oslo up about 35 per cent, from around 1,400 days in 2016 to 1,900 days in 2025, across all such plans, not only residential ones.[1]
- Imputation, not observation. The series depends on construction-cost and depreciation assumptions; the authors call for comparison with an independent transaction-based land price index, which they note is hard to build because of selection and composition effects.[1]
- Cause of the rise is open. The authors call what drove land prices up "an open question," naming faster demand growth, regulatory limits on zoned land and owners' timing decisions as candidates.[1]
See Also
- Davis–Heathcote: Price and Quantity of Residential Land
- Residual Land Valuation
- Kuminoff & Pope: land values
- Knoll, Schularick & Steger: house prices
- AEI land price indicators
- Norway
- Economic Rent
- Land Speculation
Sources
- Anna Emilie Iden, Plamen Nenov & Sonja Plaku, "Inferring Land Values in Oslo," Norges Bank Staff Memo No. 7/2026, 11 November 2026, ISSN 1504-2596. Landing page; PDF. Central-bank staff analysis (Tier 1 for its own estimates; not official Norges Bank policy). Full PDF openly served; figure values read from the prose, not the charts — used for the method, the 2003–2025 findings, the stated caveats and the policy remarks; B-claim, imputed series.