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Australia's Resource Wealth Giveaway (Wielga / Prosper Australia Research Institute)

A commissioned Prosper Australia Research Institute report (Richard Wielga, October 2026) that puts Australia's public capture of petroleum and mining value added at 14.0% and 25.7% and estimates the gap to Norway, Alaska and post-2022 Queensland coal at A$44-46 billion a year.

Entry metadata
CategoryResearch
First entry2026-11-20
Last editeda few seconds ago
AuthorProgress LLM
LicenseCC BY 4.0

Summary

Australia's Resource Wealth Giveaway: How weak public capture leaves billions in revenue on the table (October 2026) is a report commissioned by the Prosper Australia Research Institute, the research arm of the Georgist advocacy body Prosper Australia, from independent economist Richard Wielga, formerly of Victoria's Department of Treasury and Finance. It is an advocacy-commissioned estimate, not a peer-reviewed or official statistical one, and every figure below is the report's own.

The report measures what share of resource-sector value added governments collect. It puts Australian petroleum at 14.0% and mining at 25.7% over 2014-15 to 2023-24, against benchmarks of about 40% (Norway), 42% (Alaska) and about 41% (Queensland coal after 2022). It estimates the shortfall at A$44-46 billion a year and recommends market-linked state royalties and Commonwealth petroleum-tax reform. It follows Prosper's earlier Total Resource Rents of Australia with a narrower scope.

What the Report Measures

The public-capture ratio is public resource revenue divided by sector gross value added (GVA), taken as a ratio of ten-year totals. Revenue is company tax attributable to the sector, royalties, the petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT), excise and fees, Commonwealth and state combined. Inputs named by the report are ABS National Accounts GVA, ATO company-tax statistics by industry and Final Budget Outcome PRRT receipts; the royalty series comes from an EY study prepared for the Minerals Council of Australia, an industry-commissioned source. The petroleum/mining split of GVA is Prosper's own proxy from ABS industry value-added shares, not a published ABS series.

The report calls the ratio "a value share, not a rent or profit share" (Appendix B). All figures are described as indicative.

Findings

  • Australia (2014-15 to 2023-24). Petroleum 14.0% (A$83.3bn over A$594.8bn); mining 25.7% (A$448.0bn over A$1,745.6bn).
  • Norway. About 40% on the report's "adjusted" basis: state-ownership returns are removed from the numerator and the state's direct-interest share of reserves (about 30-33%) from the denominator. The report's variants give 27% without the denominator adjustment and 50% with all state returns included. It concedes the reserve-share proxy is "not a perfect denominator adjustment" (Box 4).
  • Alaska. 42% including an estimated federal company tax, scaled from state tax by the 21%/9.4% statutory-rate ratio; 38.8% without it, per the state's Revenue Sources Book.
  • Queensland coal. After the 2022 progressive royalty tiers (7% rising to 40% above A$300 a tonne) the report finds about 41% over three strong-price years. Its own ten-year Queensland ratio is 30.0%. Production stayed at 222-224 Mt, active mines rose from 53 to 60 and coal employment is about 26,000. The report concedes the Saraji South job cuts and has no state-level coal capex series.
  • Mining is "not obviously weak" on this measure, though flat royalties do not rise with prices.
  • PRRT. The report says the tax "looks strong on paper" but has not produced strong, timely revenue. It mentions carried-forward deductions once, as a reason LNG payments are delayed, and does not discuss uplift.

The Revenue Gap Calculation

The gap is (benchmark ratio minus Australian ratio) multiplied by ten-year sector GVA, divided by ten, in June 2026 prices. For mining, (40.6% - 25.66%) x A$1,745.6bn gives about A$28bn a year. For petroleum the gap is A$16bn on the Norway benchmark or A$18bn on Alaska's. The report totals A$44-46bn, "around $45 billion". Norway and Alaska are alternatives, not additions.

The calculation is static, holding GVA constant. It applies a three-year Queensland coal ratio to all Australian mining, including iron ore and gold, which the report flags. It is a gap in total government take, not a forecast of new receipts. A further illustration, that foreign state-linked ownership accounts for almost A$2 billion a year of the gap, allocates the gap in proportion to export shares and is described by the report as illustrative.

Relation to the Georgist Case

The report bears on how much revenue resource rents could supply, and on the Norway and Alaska models. Its recommendations are market-linked or hybrid state royalties, whose rate adjusts with price against a rolling ten-year median, and reform of Commonwealth petroleum taxation. It states that it "does not design a new Commonwealth petroleum tax" (executive summary) and does not recommend a state-owned resource company. It proposes no cash-flow tax and no land-value charge. Its slogan is "Low, flat royalties are policy choices" (executive summary).

Limits and Honest Assessment

  • Advocacy-commissioned, not peer-reviewed. Prosper exists to advocate rent capture, and the figures are attributed estimates that have not been independently replicated.
  • Value share, not rent share. Dividing by GVA mixes returns to capital and labour with rent. A high-cost LNG sector shows a lower ratio on that measure, as the report acknowledges.
  • The Queensland benchmark is thin. Three strong-price years, estimated company tax and an IVA-based proxy denominator support the 41%; the ten-year figure is 30.0%. The A$28bn mining line is driven by this benchmark more than by weak observed mining capture.
  • Norway's 40% depends on a proxy. Reserve share is not GVA share; the unadjusted figure is 27%.
  • Investment is unmeasured. Production, mine counts and employment are indicators only.

Nuances

The roughly 15% on the Nassios page is PRRT alone divided by a resource-rent proxy, with Norway at about 48%. Wielga's 14.0% is all government take divided by GVA, with Norway at 40%. The similar numbers are coincidence; the two measures should not be presented as corroborating each other. Likewise the ATO PRRT-payable series on the royalties page is on a different basis from the Budget cash-receipts series Wielga uses.

See Also

Sources

  1. Richard Wielga, Australia's Resource Wealth Giveaway (Prosper Australia Research Institute, October 2026). Landing page; PDF — used for all figures, the capture-ratio definition, benchmarks, the gap calculation and the recommendations. B-claim for the report's own calculations, presented as its figures; Tier 2 commissioned estimate; full PDF openly served; Appendices B and D set out the method.
  2. Inputs the report names, not independently re-read: ABS National Accounts GVA; ATO company-tax statistics; Final Budget Outcome PRRT receipts; Queensland Budget papers; norskpetroleum.no; Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue Sources Book — used for the report's numerators and denominators. The EY study for the Minerals Council of Australia is industry-commissioned.