Florenz Plassmann

Overview

Florenz Plassmann is an economist who has co-authored multiple contributions to the land-economics and public-finance literature with Nicolaus Tideman. His two principal works in this area are a 2000 Journal of Urban Economics paper providing the strongest multi-municipality empirical evidence that split-rate (two-rate) property taxation increases construction, and a 2008 paper proposing auction-based mechanisms to solve the holdout problem in urban land assembly. He is Professor of Economics and Political Science at Ohio University, where he served as Dean of the College of Arts & Sciences (2019–2022); from 1999 to 2019 he was on the faculty of Binghamton University (SUNY), chairing its economics department (2013–2015) and serving as associate dean of Harpur College (2015–2019).[3]

Key Contributions

Split-Rate Taxation and Construction (2000)

Plassmann and Tideman's 2000 paper, "A Markov Chain Monte Carlo Analysis of the Effect of Two-Rate Property Taxes on Construction," assembled data on building permits from 15 Pennsylvania municipalities that taxed land at a higher rate than improvements, covering the period 1972–1994. Pennsylvania is uniquely suited to this analysis because state law permits cities to set separate land and building rates, creating a natural experiment with many cases and degrees of variation. The authors used Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods to estimate the effect while handling the statistical difficulties of the panel.[1]

The key finding: a higher tax rate on land, relative to the rate on structures, is associated with a statistically significant increase in the number and value of building permits. The effect operates in the direction Georgist theory predicts — shifting the tax burden off improvements and onto land encourages development. Where the Pittsburgh study by Oates and Schwab examined a single city, this paper exploits variation across many, making it the strongest multi-municipality empirical evidence for the split-rate-increases-construction outcome.[1]

Efficient Land Assembly (2008)

Tideman and Plassmann's 2008 paper, "Providing Incentives for Efficient Land Assembly," tackles the holdout problem: when a project needs many adjacent parcels, individual owners can block assembly or extort excess payment by refusing to sell. The authors design auction-based and self-assessment mechanisms that elicit owners' true valuations and enable efficient land assembly without coercion — a problem closely related to the Harberger tax (COST) idea of self-assessed values. The paper shows that the Georgist tradition contributes not only a tax proposal but practical mechanism-design solutions to land-market frictions.[2]

Significance

Plassmann's collaborative work with Tideman bridges the Georgist tradition and rigorous modern empirical and mechanism-design economics. The 2000 construction paper is frequently cited as the strongest multi-jurisdiction evidence that shifting property taxes off buildings and onto land stimulates development — a central empirical claim in the case for land value taxation. The 2008 land-assembly paper extends Georgist reasoning into the domain of market design, addressing a practical friction — the holdout problem — that arises from the unique, immovable nature of land.[1][2]

Beyond the two Tideman collaborations highlighted here, Plassmann's wider research program spans public economics and urban economics as well as voting methods, public choice, and environmental economics.[3]

See Also

• Nicolaus Tideman
• Split-Rate Taxation
• Plassmann & Tideman — Construction
• Tideman & Plassmann — Land Assembly
• Holdout Problem
• Split-Rate Taxation Increases Construction

Sources

1. Florenz Plassmann & Nicolaus Tideman (2000), "A Markov Chain Monte Carlo Analysis of the Effect of Two-Rate Property Taxes on Construction," Journal of Urban Economics 47(2):216–247. Publisher — used for the empirical finding that split-rate taxation increases construction, the MCMC methodology, and the 15-municipality Pennsylvania dataset.
2. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann (2008), "Providing Incentives for Efficient Land Assembly," SSRN. Paper — used for the auction-based and self-assessment mechanisms addressing the holdout problem in land assembly.
3. Biographical/affiliation details — used for Plassmann's positions (Binghamton University 1999–2019, department chair and associate dean; Ohio University, Professor and Dean of Arts & Sciences 2019–2022) and the scope of his research (public, urban, and environmental economics; voting methods and public choice). Verified this session via his Ohio University / Binghamton faculty listings and research profiles. Google Scholar