The California Environmental Quality Act
|February 2, 2014||Posted by Fred Foldvary under Editorials|
The worst intervention by governments, aside from aggressive war, is excessive litigation. Taxes are burdensome, but they are predictable. The reason that enterprises are not entirely crushed by taxation is that much of the tax burden is at the expense of land rent, so it ends up destroying the economy’s surplus, but not totally wreaking the economy. Regulations act as a tax to impose costs on enterprise, and much of the cost is passed on to workers and the public, so they make us poorer but don’t totally stifle the economy. Subsidies create distortions that generate inequality and the boom-bust cycle, but subsidies is what politics is all about. The worst intervention, that does the most to crush enterprise and employment, is vicious litigation.
A prime example of litigative intervention is the California Environmental Quality Act. CEQA is codified at the Public Resources Code Section 21000 et seq. As California’s web site for CEQA states, “Most proposals for physical development in California are subject to the provisions of CEQA.” The “frequently asked questions” web section explains that “CEQA is a self-executing statute.” That means that “its provisions are enforced, as necessary, by the public through litigation and the threat thereof”. Past court cases can be seen on the web site of the California Natural Resources Agency at <http://ceres.ca.gov/ceqa/cases/>.
As described by a “Schumpeter” blog article in the 25 January 2014 Economist, “The not so Golden State,” this law “has mutated into a monster”. Anybody in California may file a CEQA lawsuit against any project using environmental protection as an excuse. The plaintiffs win half the cases. If someone sues a company and loses, the defendant still has to cover his legal expenses. Many of the lawsuits under CEQA are also against governmental development projects and against permits by local governments to enable private development.
Suppose a developer seeks to build an industrial park. If he hires non-union workers, the union attacks with a CEQA lawsuit. So the builder hires expensive union labor. Suppose someone owns a gasoline station, and a competitor wants to set up a station nearby. The station owner stops the potential competitor by filing a CEQA case. In 2011, there were 254 “California disinvestment events,” in which companies employing more than one hundred workers either left the state or expanded in another state rather than in California. This is estimated to have gotten worse in 2012 and 2013.
The litigations and regulations of California fall hardest on manufacturing. California’s high sales tax and low property tax also induces cities to favor retail stores over manufacturing. Hostile policies in California are largely responsible for the flight of manufacturing to other states and to foreign countries. As noted by the Economist article, electronic devices are designed in “Silicon Valley”, the region from San Francisco to San Jose, but manufactured in Asia. Some environmentalists realize that CEQA does little to protect the environment, but attempts to reform the law have stalled. The frivolous lawsuits reward lawyers, unions, companies seeking to stifle competition, and “not in my backyard” opponents of development.
Litigation is the worst way to handle social problems. Lawsuits impose unpredictable and expensive costs on enterprise. Such laws let opportunists exploit legitimate job-creating industries. Excessive litigation is further rewarded by making the winning defendants of lawsuits have to pay their legal costs. We then get excessive malpractice suits that force doctors to buy expensive insurance. Federal and state laws that enable litigation for job and housing discrimination and environmental protection end up enriching lawyers who get much of the gains.
The best ways to handle environmental destruction is with covenants and easements, along with a liability rule for damages. If some development harms the natural environment, then the government assesses the damage, and the polluter pays for the damage, either as a one-time charge or as periodic payments for on-going pollution. Developers know in advance that they are liable for damage, and so they would have the incentive to prevent the payment by doing their own environmental assessment. The issue would be between the developer and the state, without involving attorneys and court costs.
Economic theory has recognized for the past hundred years that the optimal policy for pollution is a charge paid by the polluters, passed on to the customers, fully compensating society for the damage. That can be done by a pollution tax.
English common law traditionally provided law-suit protection against potential negative effects and damages to one’s property. Litigation can be a useful enforcement and restitution tool, but it has to be within a sensible legal system. In the English tort system, if a plaintiff loses a law suit, the loser has to pay the legal costs of the winner. So if a company sues another firm just to stifle competition, using the environment as an excuse, and that company loses the lawsuit, then that company has to pay the legal costs of the winning competitor. That would stop frivolous or phony law suits. And that is why the lawyer lobby will stop such a legal reform in the USA.