Hungarian Insiders Compete for the Spoils of Corruption
|May 26, 2014||Posted by Staff under Corruption|
This 2014 excerpt of EUROPP (European Politics and Policy) of the London School of Economics, Apr 24, is by Johannes Wachs.
Hungary faces a greater corruption problem than other states in Central and Eastern Europe, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Corruption is systemic, rather than associated specifically with particular governments or politicians.
EU funds are particularly susceptible to the problem; 33.8 per cent of EU funded projects received only one bid, compared to 29 per cent of those funded with national funds alone. Post-award contract modification was three times more likely when EU funds were involved. Besides the waste and damage corruption brings, the misuse of EU funds exacerbates tensions between Hungary and net-contributor states in the rest of the EU.
EU payments to Hungary in the 2007-2013 budget cycle amounted to a positive balance of 24 billion euros, or above 3 per cent of the country’s GDP every year. Given the anemic growth of the Hungarian economy in the last decade and low levels of investment, these funds are critical to Hungary’s development.
Bribes and similar interactions between lower level bureaucrats and private level individuals are rare. Instead there is an unspoken culture of ‘legal corruption’, a common understanding in the bureaucracy that connected firms should receive preference.
Many contracts are handed out by manipulation of the procurement process, and without competition. For example, an unattractive contract may be modified after a friendly firm secures the deal. Alternatively, limited advertisement or a short submission deadline can exclude firms that are out of the loop.
Groups of business elites connected to different political factions thrive or struggle based on who is in power. Prior to the 2010 Hungarian election, market leaders lost about 25-30 per cent of their market share, and were replaced by a new group of companies that saw a comparable increase in market share following the change of government. A high profile example is the success of Közgép Zrt, a construction company with many personal connections to the government.
Political capture of the bureaucracy because of incumbency is a serious problem in the region. Moreover, the increasing role of the state and domestic actors in the banking and utility sectors also raises the potential for new areas of corruption to emerge.
Ed. Notes: Most people all over the world suffer from the corruption of the well-connected. Only a few societies have managed to curb corruption. How did they do it? However they did it, can corrupt societies copy what worked elsewhere? To learn what works, political reformers might want to study sociology as well.
Personally, I think ordinary people must demand a Citizen’s Dividend just as boldly as insiders demand a huge slice of the action. It’s ironic normal citizens have a harder time demanding this fundamental justice than greedy insiders have demanding more than a fair share. But we can’t leave so much wealth on the table and expect the innately grasping to walk away from it.
We must capture and share society’s surplus so it won’t tempt the unscrupulous. Further, we must demand an end to taxation, replacing them with dues, and thereby elevate people from mere taxpayers — peons — to respected members of society with equal rights. Geonomics is how to do it.